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Zen and the Art of Exemplary
Damages Assessment
Several years ago, I was a plodding jogger-no style, head
always bent forward looking at the pavement. My spouse,
ever helpful, bought me a copy of The Zen of Running, a
beautiful book which extolled the virtues of running with
head erect to enable the deep, fluid breathing of the per-
fectly functioning human machine. The next day-filled
with Zen-I left for my morning run. Head erect and
breathing deeply, I began to understand the potential run-
ner's satori. Moments later I lay asprawl on the sidewalk,
only then remembering that I had always before run with
my head bowed to watch out for the cracks in the sidewalk
pavement.*
INTRODUCTION
"A single blow with practically no injury resulting, how-
ever wrong the blow may have been, cannot, we believe, result
in a $20,000 [exemplary damages]1 award in absence of pas-
sion and prejudice on the part of the jury.",2 This conclusion,
* A personal interlude. Sometimes stories exist just to be enjoyed. Usually, they
tell us about the foibles of human life (or at least of the teller). One senses that,
although courts and juries might enjoy the freedom of an apparently unbridled ap-
proach to assessing exemplary damages, having a verdict overturned as excessive
leaves both wondering why no one bothered to point out the pitfalls of assessment.
Perhaps, it is time for the Court to devise and prescribe a heads-down, plodding ap-
proach to the assessment of exemplary damages in Kentucky.
I Although Kentucky courts generally use the term "punitive damages," "exem-
plary damages" is used throughout this Comment in place of "punitive damages."
Although "punitive" and "exemplary" are synonyms, "exemplary damages" will be
used as a term of art to refer to those damages-which have historically been denoted
as "punitive damages," "exemplary damages," and "vindictive damages"-awarded in
addition to compensatory damages. This terminology convention is helpful since the
discussion of exemplary damages often focuses on the non-punitive purposes of those
damages.
2 Mantooth v. Fowler, No. 82-CA-2527-MR, slip op. at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. July 29,
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in an unpublished opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
applied to litigation evolving out of a dispute between two ex-
professional football players.' A single blow by the defendant
resulted in a compensatory damages award of $2,210 to the
plaintiff, with exemplary damages in the amount of $20,000.4
The court upheld the compensatory damages but found that
"[t]here [was] simply not a sufficient relationship between the
[exemplary] damage award, the injuries sustained, and the
acts causing them."5 In remanding the case for a new trial on
the amount of exemplary damages, the court failed to articu-
late the criteria a jury6 should use to fairly assess exemplary
damages.'
The Kentucky Court, like many other courts,' has relied
upon a standard of appellate review that is predominantly vis-
ceral.9 While such a standard of review offers the advantage of
1983), discretionary review granted, (Apr. 11, 1984).
1 Id., slip op. at 1-2. The court of appeals opinion met with predictable notoriety
in the media which capitalized on the human interest aspects of the litigation. See
Punch Not Worth $20,000, Court Decides, Lexington Herald-Leader, July 30, 1983,
at B1, col. 1.
4 Mantooth v. Fowler, No. 82-CA-2527-MR, slip op. at 3.
Id., slip op. at 4.
6 For convenience of expression, "jury" is used to refer to the fact finder,
whether court or jury.
The jury in Fowler v. Mantooth awarded $210 for medical expenses, $2,000 for
pain and suffering and $20,000 punitive damages. The jury instructions, based on the
complaint, permitted awards of up to $210 for medical expenses, $5,000 for pain and
suffering and $50,000 in punitive damages. The instructions, thus, contained an obvi-
ous 10 to 1 ratio between the intangible damages--"pain and suffering" and "punitive
damages." The ratio between the highest permitted awards for compensatory dam-
ages (a total of $5,210 for medical expenses and pain and suffering) and punitive
damages ($50,000) also approximates 10 to 1. The jury verdict maintained the 10 to 1
ratio between intangible damages and continued an approximate 10 to 1 ratio be-
tween compensatory damages and punitive damages. It appears that the jury was
simply applying, with discretion, what it perceived to be the court's guidelines. The
court of appeals' labelling of the jury's decision as motivated by passion and prejudice
fails to address what likely occurred and fails to offer future assistance to the jury.
8 See K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 3.6(B)-(C) (1980). See also Morris, Puni-
tive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (1930-31) (judicial tests
devised to review an exemplary damages verdict are often skewed to support "the
judge's view of the verdict, formulated before the test is thought of").
I See, e.g., Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1974), in
which the court stated:
After our having carefully considered all of the facts and having determined
that there was not a sufficient relationship of the punitive damages to the
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deferring to the creativity and wisdom of the jury,10 it also
results in a dearth of meaningful guidance to juries and the
parties who appear before them.
Notwithstanding the importance of essentially visceral
decisions to the resolution of disputes in uncharted areas of
the law, the needs of litigants for more effective and economi-
cal litigation, and the needs of juries for guidance, mandate
the articulation, insofar as possible, of clear and well reasoned
criteria for the assessment of exemplary damages." Since any
such criteria are necessarily related to the court's understand-
ing of the purposes of these awards, this Comment will first
delineate the purposes of exemplary damages and then con-
sider assessment criteria which advance those purposes. Fi-
nally, procedural mechanisms to insure appropriate integra-
tion of these criteria into the trial process will be suggested.
I. THE PURPOSES OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
The common law origin of exemplary damages is a bit un-
injury and the cause thereof, we are of the opinion that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on the ground that the ver-
dict was excessive.
Id. at 764. See also Maddix v. Gammon, 169 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Ky. 1943) ("The award
in the case at bar in no sense shocks our conscience as being the result of passion and
prejudice."); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 147 S.W. 411, 414 (Ky. 1912) ("While the
verdict is large, we cannot say that it is so large as to appear at first blush to be the
result of prejudice or passion on the part of the jury.").
10 Cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 147 S.W. at 414 (jury could have given
damages for humiliation or mortification).
" See Morris, supra note 8, at 1207-08. Professor Morris pointedly challenges
the courts to take seriously their responsibility of giving meaningful direction to the
jury in exemplary damages cases:
There is something "real" about telling a jury how to decide a case, and the
process has great possibilities of focusing attention on problems. If judges
must tell juries what to decide and how to decide it, and if judges see that
verbal law should be tools, then instructions will constantly undergo the
test of official scrutiny for their helpfulness in locating and solving the so-
cial problems raised by cases. . . .Apart from the necessity of charging the
jury, the judge has little incentive to formulate the problems before reach-
ing the decision; but if the judge must talk about problems and how they
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certain. 12 Commentators generally point to Huckle v. Money 3
as the first reported "exemplary damages" opinion,'14 but the
impetus for the development of the doctrine remains in
doubt.'" Among the theories advanced for the genesis of ex-
emplary damages are: a reluctance to set aside excessive jury
verdicts,' compensation for intangible harms17 and punish-
ment of the wrongdoer.' 8 Whatever the original purposes of
the damages may have been,' 9 only the theories of compensa-
12 K. REDDEN, supra note 8, at § 2.2(A)(2).
13 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763). The court refused to set aside a 300 pound ster-
ling verdict in an action against an agent of the King for trespass, assault and false
imprisonment under a general warrant. Despite the absence of physical injury, the
Lord Chief Justice remarked:
[I think the jury has] done right in giving exemplary damages. To enter a
man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence,
is worse than the Spanish Inquisition, a law under which no Englishman
would wish to live an hour, it was a most daring attack made upon the
liberty of the subject.
Id. at 769.
"I See 1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 348, at 687
(9th ed. 1920); Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REv.
870, 872 (1975-76); Note, Punitive Damages and the Admissibility of Evidence of
Wealth, 29 ALA. L. REV. 564, 568 (1977-78). A companion case, Wilkes v. Wood, 98
Eng. Rep. 489 (1763), may be the first explicit common law reference to a punitive
function for damages: "Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding
for the future, and as proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself." Id. at
498-99.
15 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02, at 3-4
(1983).
'" See id.; K. REDDEN, supra note 8, at § 2.2(A)(2) (observing that jury members
were at one time subject to imprisonment and confiscation of their property if their
verdict was deemed excessive and set aside); T. SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at §§ 349-
50 (observing that, historically, juries had power to set damages without
interference).
11 See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 15, § 1.02, at 4-7; K. REDDEN, supra
note 8, at §§ 2.2(B)-(C).
18 See K. REDDEN, supra note 8, at §§ 2.2(D)-(F) (discussing deterrence, the need
for more severe punishment for physical injury to the person, and revenge as
rationales).
19 Isolating such a purpose is not critical. "The functional autonomy of motives"
is a psychological principle used to explain the phenomenon that the verbalized justi-
fication for behavior often adapts to criticism and changing circumstances while the
behavior itself simply persists. This principle, charitably construed, suggests that in-
dividuals (and courts) often make good decisions without being able to articulate
clearly their reasons and later gradually evolve thoughtful and reasonable justifica-
tions for their decisions. See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
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tion and punishment are found in Kentucky law." Arguably,
both are relevant to the assessment of exemplary damages.
A. The Evolution of Kentucky's Understanding of Exem-
plary Damages
The evolution of the Kentucky Supreme Court's under-
standing of exemplary damages reflects the ambiguity of pur-
pose in the common law genesis of the doctrine. 1 Some early
Kentucky opinions advocated a compensatory rationale for
exemplary damages.2 Other contemporaneous Kentucky deci-
sions indicated a punitive purpose for the award.2
Chiles v. Drake,4 an 1859 decision, settled the issue for
several years. The Court considered a defendant's contention
that, where the alleged tortious conduct subjected the defen-
dant to criminal liability, an award of exemplary damages
based on that conduct was a violation of Kentucky's constitu-
tional prohibition against double jeopardy. At the time of
20 See, e.g., Hawkins & Co. v. Riley, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 80, 88 (1856) (punitive);
Major v. Pulliam, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 582, 584 (1835) (compensatory). While deferential
to jury verdicts, the Kentucky Supreme Court views the setting aside of excessive
jury verdicts as one of its "highest duties." See Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508
S.W.2d 759, 763 (1974).
21 See notes 12-19 supra and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Major v. Pulliam, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) at 584 ("The chief reason why the
owner of the mare was entitled to damages considerably exceeding the value of the
property, is because his sensibilities were awakened, and his peace and quietude dis-
turbed, by the provoking malice and peculiar cruelty evinced by the manner of killing
a favorite domestic animal .... ).
22 See, e.g., Hawkins & Co. v. Riley, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) at 88 ("To exempt the
[defendant] from any liability beyond the actual injury in such cases, would, in many
cases, deprive the traveling public of any protection. . . ."); Tyson v. Ewing, 26 Ky.
(3 J.J. Marsh.) 186, 187 (1830) ("If trespass were bound to pay in damages no more
than the exact value of the property, forcibly taken and converted by them, there
would be no motive created by the operation of the law, to induce them to desist and
abstain from invading the rights of others.").
2 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146 (1859).
25 Id. at 151. Kentucky's double jeopardy proscription provides: "No person
shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb. . . ." Ky.
CONST. § 13. Interestingly, a literal construction of this provision of the Kentucky
Constitution would suggest that there is no double jeopardy issue where exemplary
damages are concerned, since the damages award affects property rather than "life or
limb." The Court later held that the double jeopardy proscription applied only to
cases where the "punishument inflicted is infamous" and not to crimes punishable
merely by a fine. See Commonwealth v. Prall, 142 S.W. 202, 205 (Ky. 1912). In Prall,
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this decision, nineteenth century scholars were locked in de-
bate as to whether the proper purpose of exemplary damages
should be compensatory or punitive.26 Drawing on the distinc-
tions advanced by these scholars, the Court finessed the con-
stitutional issue by declaring that exemplary damages are "al-
lowed as compensatory for the private injury complained of in
the action. '27 The Court observed that every damages award,
whether exemplary or compensatory, has a punitive effect.28
The greater amount of an award including exemplary dam-
ages was justified, "because the injury has been increased by
the manner [in which] it was inflicted."29 Thus, the Court rec-
ognized that an injury caused maliciously or recklessly is
likely to result in greater intangible harm than the same in-
jury caused negligently. Larger awards, while clearly having
an adverse effect on the defendant, were intended only to in-
sure full compensation of the injured plaintiff.
This compensatory purpose was reflected in "smart
money" terminology used by the Court over the next 100
years.30 Exemplary damages, or "smart money," allowed the
jury to compensate the plaintiff for the "smarting" nature of
the injury, that is, for then otherwise incompensable injuries
such as embarrassment, humiliation and outrage.3 1 Although
the Court was concerned more with the spirit of the double jeopardy proscription
than with its literal wording. See id. Depending upon whether exemplary damages are
construed as an "infamous punishment," Chiles v. Drake may demonstrate judicial
reaction to a false issue.
21 See 2 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253, at 242 n.2 (2d
ed. 1848) (criticizing Sedgwick's view of exemplary damages as punitive); T.
SEDGWICK, supra note 14, at § 353 (criticizing Greenleaf's compensatory rationale for
exemplary damages). For a description of the conflict between Sedgwick and Green-
leaf, see Note, supra note 14, at 571-73.
2" See Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) at 151-52. The Court also distinguished
the private civil suit and the public criminal action. Id. at 152 ("Every recovery for a
personal injury, with or without vindictive damages, operates in some degree as a
punishment, but it is a punishment which results from the redress of a private wrong,
and does not, therefore, violate either the meaning or the spirit of the constitution.").
2 Id. at 152.
2 Id. at 151.
'0 See, e.g., Bisset v. Goss, 481 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Ky. 1972).
" See Note, supra note 14, at 574-75. In being treated as synonomous with "ex-
emplary damages," "smart money" was eventually construed to refer to the "smart-
ing" caused to the defendant by the damages award. See id. This evolution in the
meaning of the term reflects the increasing emphasis on the punitive purposes of ex-
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progress in the doctrine of compensatory damages gradually
lessened the need for exemplary damages to serve as a means
of effecting full compensation for the plaintiff,32 exemplary
damages may yet have validity as a mechanism which permits
the jury to compensate the otherwise incompensable3
Without explicitly overruling Chiles v. Drake, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in 1908 again confirmed the punitive
purpose of exemplary damages3 4 and moved toward the main-
stream of American legal thought on the issue. For a time,
the Court also continued to assert a compensatory rationale
for exemplary damages.3 However, recent Kentucky opinions
have recognized only the punitive purposes of an exemplary
award.3 7 Possibly, the Kentucky Court never fully abandoned
the theory that exemplary damages also have a compensatory
purpose and it may be that both purposes remain viable in
Kentucky today. 8
B. Exploring the Purposes of Exemplary Damages
Although there is considerable debate over whether exem-
plary damages have any validity,39 the doctrine is accepted in
emplary damages.
31 Plaintiffs have been able to recover actual damages in tort for mental anguish,
pain and suffering, embarrassment and hurt feelings for many years in the United
States. Awarding exemplary damages~on the same basis is redundant. K. REDDEN,
supra note 8, § 2.3(A), at 31.
" See notes 50-61 infra and accompanying text.
3, See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Roth, 114 S.W. 264 (Ky. 1908), where the Court
stated:
[I]t is generally considered ... that punitive damages are awarded as a
civil punishment inflicted upon the wrongdoer, rather than as indemnity to
the injured party, although, as he will be the beneficiary of the punishment
inflicted, it might with much propriety be said that they are allowed by way
of remuneration for the aggravated wrong done.
Id. at 266 (citing Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) at 146).
31 See K. REDDEN, supra note 8, at § 2.3(A).
3' See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritehel, 147 S.W. 411, 414 (Ky. 1912)
("[P]unitive damages, when allowed, are given as compensation to the plaintiff, and
not solely as a punishment of the defendant.").
37 See, e.g., Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d at 762-63.
" See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 117(1) n.99 (1966) (citing several Kentucky cases as
authority for the position that exemplary damages are not punitive).
3 A delineation of this controversy is beyond the scope of this Comment. The
most forceful attack on the doctrine is that, because of its punitive intent, an exem-
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most states40 and at the federal level.4' The central purposes
for exemplary damages are punitive and compensatory.42
Within the punitive rubric, two distinct sub-purposes emerge:
deterrence and retribution. The compensatory rationale also
contains two sub-purposes: traditional compensation and
compensation for loss of equilibrium.
1. The Punitive Rationale
Deterrence reflects society's interest in protecting itself
and its members.43 Deterrence may be either specific or gen-
eral. Specific deterrence is the use of the sanction to change
the conduct of the individual wrongdoer.44 General deterrence
plary damages award may violate both constitutional provisions proscribing double
jeopardy and constitutional provisions guaranteeing due process of law. For example,
some commentators assert that the punitive nature of exemplary damages requires
that the defendant's liability be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt." See J. GHIARDI
& J. KIRCHER, supra note 15, at §§ 3.02-.03; K. REDDEN, supra note 8, at § 7.2; Long,
supra note 14, at 884-85; Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. RE .
303, 331-37 (1980) [hereinafter cited as In Defense]; Note, The Imposition of Punish-
ment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158,
1177-84 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Imposition]; Note, Criminal Safeguards and
the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CH. L. REV. 408 (1976).
40 Five states either ban exemplary damages or make them available only under
very limited circumstances. Nebraska appears to be the only state which totally re-
jects exemplary damages. See Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1975). Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts and Washington allow exemplary damages only as provided by
statute. See Killebrew v. Abbott Laboratories, 359 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1978); City of
Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265 (Mass. 1943); Henriksen
v. Lyons, 652 P.2d 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). Indiana generally prohibits the imposi-
tion of exemplary damages for conduct which is also subject to criminal sanctions.
See Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy,
20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945).
41 See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851). See also City of New-
port v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-68 (1981) (while holding exemplary
damages unavailable in a § 1983 action againft a municipality because such an award
only serves to punish the taxpayers, the Court observed that such damages would be
available "in 'a proper' § 1983 action").
42 See Long, supra note 14, at 875. Cf. K. REDDEN, supra note 8, at § 2.3(A);
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 520-22 (1956-
57) ("the unbroken line of judicial authority in all but three states would seem to
preclude any argument that exemplary damages 'in theory' retain any major compen-
satory character").
43 See Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 639, 647-49 (1979-80).
44 W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 22 (1972).
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is the use of the sanction to change the conduct of potential
wrongdoers by making an example of the individual wrong-
doer.45 Whether general or specific, the deterrent purpose of
exemplary damages is widely recognized.4 6
Unlike deterrence, retribution is the exactment of punish-
ment for punishment's sake.4 7 This vengeful purpose of exem-
plary damages was aptly characterized by the early labelling
of the damages as "vindictive damages. '4  The damages
award, under this theory, serves as a vehicle for venting the
outrage felt by the plaintiff and community towards the
defendant.4
9
2. The Compensatory Rationale
Compensation may have been the original purpose of ex-
emplary damages.5 0 The absence of ordinary tort compensa-
tion for humiliation, emotional distress and other intangible
harms may have precipitated early awards under this doc-
trine.5 1 Even though the availability of compensatory recovery
in tort has expanded dramatically since the inception of ex-
emplary damages,52 it is doubtful that all intangible harms are
now sufficiently recompensed.53 Moreover, it seems presump-
tuous to deny juries the opportunity to identify (even if una-
ble to conceptualize) hithertofore unarticulated harms and to
attempt their appropriate compensation by use of exemplary
45 Id. at 23.
46 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977) ("Punitive damages are
damages... awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and
to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future."). But see note
39 supra.
47 W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 44, at 24.
49 See Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) at 151 ("Punitive, vindictive, and exem-
plary damages, are all synonymous terms.").
49 K. REDDEN, supra note 8, at § 2.2(F).
50 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
51 Id. Clearly, Kentucky accepted this purpose for exemplary damages at one
time. See, e.g., Major v. Pulliam, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) at 582-84. See also notes 22-32
supra and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Craft v. Rice, No. 83-SC-376-DG, slip op. at 8 (Ky. June 14, 1984)
(recognizing the tort of "outrageous conduct" in Kentucky); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Ritchel, 147 S.W. at 414 (permitting compensation for humiliation).
53 See notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the need to




Some jurisdictions allow exemplary damages as a means
of compensating the plaintiff for attorney's fees.5 5 This partic-
ular rationale is unpersuasive if the purpose of exemplary
damages is solely compensatory.56 However, in combination
with punitive purposes for exemplary awards, compensation
for litigation expenses may be an incentive for a plaintiff to
pursue otherwise nominal causes of action which, because of
the malicious intent or recklessness of the actor, could have
resulted in serious harm.57 Some commentators have recog-
nized that this compensatory function is achieved in the tradi-
tional choice to award exemplary damages to the plaintiff
rather than to the coffers of the state. 8
Exemplary damages could also be awarded to compensate
the plaintiff for the "loss of equilibrium" he experiences as a
result of his feelings of anger or vengefulness toward the
wrongdoer.59 Although courts and juries have recognized that
humiliation and embarrassment may be debilitating,60 there is
little evidence of a corresponding awareness that feelings of
vengefulness and anger may equally disrupt the equilibrium
of one's life. Perhaps a plaintiff who is enraged, rather than
mortified, by a defendant's malicious and injurious conduct
" The advent and development of exemplary damages clarifies the role of juries
in the evolution of the law. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Morris,
supra note 8, at 1179-80 ("[In fixing the amount of punitive damages . . . [i]t is
evident that the problems of social control may require more technical skill than [ju-
rors] have or can acquire.").
See Note, supra note 42, at 521.
SIt remains unclear why, within a purely compensatory scheme, attorney's fees
should be recoverable for some harms but not for others. See J. GHLAURI & J.
KIRCHER, supra note 15, at § 2.11.
V Mallor & Roberts, supra note 43, at 649-50. Compensating the injured plaintiff
for litigation expenses is beneficial to society since such compensation increases the
likelihood that the wrongdoer will be sued and that similar wrongdoings will be
deterred.
11 See id.; Note, supra note 42, at 525-26 ("if exemplary damages were to go to
the public treasury, fewer wrongdoers would be punished, since a plaintiff would have
no inducement to bring suit if the compensatory damages were likely to be small").
" Obviously, any injury to the plaintiff can be characterized as a "loss of equilib-
rium." The term is proposed as a term of art for this discussion to maintain a judg-
ment-free perspective on the plaintiff's feelings of anger and vengefulness.
60 See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 147 S.W. at 414 ("the jury. . . might
have awarded damages for humiliation and mortification of feeling").
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also deserves compensation as an effort to restore him to his
former emotional state.
While courts have perceived exemplary damages, in part,
as a means of avoiding self-help redress of wrongs, e" compen-
sation for loss of equilibrium can operate under a different set
of assumptions. For example, assuming that the plaintiff is
law abiding and will not seek personal revenge, considerable
discomfort and debilitation may yet have been experienced as
a result of the quite natural vengeful and spiteful feelings
aroused by the defendant's conduct. A monetary award can-
not replace a lost limb, nor can it always dissipate the urge to
take an eye for an eye, but it can be an attempt to restore one
to the legal equivalent of his prior condition. Loss of equilib-
rium could be one of the otherwise incompensable injuries
that a jury may recognize and, through exemplary damages,
rectify.
Thus, although the Kentucky courts presently stress the
punitive purposes of exemplary damages, the compensatory
rationale once espoused may yet have vitality. As criteria for
the assessment of exemplary damages are developed, both
purposes should be kept in mind.
II. CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
The guidelines provided to juries to determine a fair
award of exemplary damages should be intrinsically related to
the purposes of the damages. Unfortunately, the assessment
criteria revealed in Kentucky jury instructions provide the
jury with very little judicial conception of the role of the
award.62 This lack of guidance seems largely attributable to
61 K. REDDEN, supra note 8, at § 2.2(F) (observing that tort law generally is pre-
mised on efforts to avoid self-help redress of injury). See, e.g., Hawkins & Co. v.
Riley, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) at 88.
62 The punitive damages instruction in Mantooth v. Fowler, No. 82-CA-2527-
MR, (Ky. Ct. App. July 29, 1983), is probably typical of such instructions given in
Kentucky: "If you believe from the evidence that the assault was willful, malicious,
and without justification, you may, in your discretion, award the Plaintiff punitive
damages, not exceeding, however, the sum of $50,000.00, the amount claimed in the
Complaint." Id. at Trial Court Opinion and Order. Note the similarity to an instruc-
tion given 70 years ago:
[I]f you believe from the evidence that the defendants were guilty of gross
1983-84]
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the Court's own historical uncertainty as to the purposes of
exemplary damages.63
A recent opinion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers,"
demonstrates the potentially persisting effects of Kentucky's
one time rejection of the punitive rationale for exemplary
damages. In Island Creek the Kentucky Court of Appeals af-
firmed the propriety of the trial judge's instructing the jury
that "'[exemplary damages] are awarded against a person to
punish him for his outrageous conduct and to discourage such
person and others from similar conduct in the future.' "65 The
opinion specifically disregarded a 1900 opinion, Southern
Railway v. Barr's Administrator,6 which had declared it ob-
jectionable to define exemplary damages as being intended to
punish and deter.6 7
Since Southern Railway was a "not to be published"
opinion, the Island Creek court found it to be of "questiona-
ble binding authority" and upheld the instruction as being
clearly useful to the jury. 8 The court appears to have treated
the issue in terms of proper jury instructions generally, rather
than in terms of the proper rationale for exemplary damages.
Southern Railway had been correctly decided during a time
when Kentucky applied a purely compensatory rationale for
exemplary damages. However, Southern Railway lost its va-
lidity in the early part of this century when Kentucky's high-
est court reaffirmed the punitive rationale for exemplary
damages.69
negligence in causing said injuries, if they did cause them, in addition to
compensatory damages find also punitive damages, your whole finding not
to exceed, however, the sum of $20,000, the amount claimed in the petition.
Standard Oil Co. v. Marlow, 150 S.W. 832, 834 (Ky. 1912). In neither instruction does
the jury get appreciable guidance-other than a maximum amount established in the
pleadings-as to the proper means of determining a fair amount of exemplary
damages.
'3 See notes 21-38 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the evolution
of exemplary damages in Kentucky.
64 644 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
65 Id. at 347.
06 55 S.W. 900 (Ky. 1900).
'7 See 644 S.W.2d at 347.
11 Id. Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c) provides: "Opinions that are not to be published
shall not be cited or used as authority in any other case in any court of this state."
69 See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Roth, 114 S.W. 264, 266 (Ky. 1908).
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Island Creek illustrates the need for courts to actively re-
view the criteria for assessment of such damages in the light
of current understandings of the purposes of exemplary dam-
ages. This contention is based on the premise that the jury
best functions when it is able to apply decisional criteria simi-
lar to those which courts will employ during appellate
review.70
3. Assessment Criteria Recognized by the Kentucky
Courts
Kentucky presently requires that the exemplary damages
award "bear some relationship to the injury and the cause
thereof."' 71 A failure to show injury will result in the disallow-
ance of exemplary damages.7 2 Likewise, a failure to show a
"wanton, malicious or reckless character of the acts com-
plained of" will result in the disallowance of the award. 3
There is no requirement that exemplary damages be propor-
tional to compensatory damages 4 or even that compensatory
damages be awarded.75
As stated, Kentucky's requirement of "some relationship"
to the injury is consistent with both the punitive and the com-
pensatory rationales for exemplary damages. Injury must be
present to provide the requisite standing for recovery. The
wanton, malicious or reckless character of the conduct causing
the injury not only authorizes an exemplary damages award
but also plays a major role in its assessment. 76 The "some re-
lationship" rule allows the jury considerable flexibility in ad-
71 Cf. Morris, supra note 8, at 1207-08 (courts should give meaningful
instructions).
71 See Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Ky. 1974).
72 Lawrence v. Risen, 598 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming a
defendant's summary judgment where the plaintiff sought only punitive damages and
failed to allege actual injury caused by the conduct for which the damages were
sought).
7' See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 136 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Ky. 1939).
74 Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d at 763.
71 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 147 S.W. 411, 414 (Ky. 1912).
78 See Harrod v. Fraley, 289 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Ky. 1956) ("Exemplary or punitive
damages are generally defined as damages which are given in enhancement merely of
the ordinary damages on account of the wanton, reckless, malicious, or offensive char-
acter of the acts complained of by the plaintiff .... ").
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justing the exemplary award to both the severity of the injury
and the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct. Although
the "some relationship" principle gives the jury considerable
freedom to implement the purposes of exemplary damages,
there are additional criteria for the assessment of exemplary
damages which are consistent with the award's purposes and
which would provide the jury with significant guidance if
adopted.
B. Proposed Additional Assessment Criteria
1. Wealth of the Defendant
The vast majority of jurisdictions recognize the validity of
considering the defendant's wealth in an exemplary damages
assessment.7 The rationale for considering the defendant's
wealth is that an award is effectively punitive only if tailored
to the financial resources of the defendant.78 The retributory
and deterrent purposes of an award are not realized when the
award is inconsequential to the defendant.79 Likewise, courts
are unwilling to uphold an exemplary damages award so se-
vere, given the defendant's financial circumstances, that it
"annihilates" the defendant and thereby exceeds the purposes
of exemplary damages.8 0
Kentucky initially accepted the relevance of the defen-
dant's wealth to the assessment of exemplary damages.81
17 See Note, Evidence of Defendant's Financial Condition is Admissible to De-
termine the Amount of Punitive Damages to be Awarded Against the Defen-
dant-Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (Iowa 1977), 27 DRAKE L. REV. 584, 586 n.18
(1977-78), for a thorough listing of jurisdictions allowing the defendant's wealth to be
considered in exemplary damages assessments. Kentucky, Alabama and Texas are the
only states in which such evidence is inadmissible for this purpose. Note, supra note
14, at 567.
78 Morris, supra note 8, at 1175.
79 See, e.g., Suzore v. Rutherford, 251 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952)
("the financial condition of the defendant ... is relevant, because what would be
'smart money' to a poor man would not be, and would not serve as a deterrent, to a
rich man").
80 See In Defense, supra note 39, at 342 n.226.
"I See Louisville, C. & L.R.R. v. Mahony's Adm'x, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 235, 238
(1870) ("in this as in other cases for the recovery of punitive or exemplary damages it
was not improper to allow proof of the pecuniary ability of the defendant"). Cf. Gore
v. Chadwick, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 477, 478 (1838) (plaintiff's proof of defendant's worth
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However, in 1900, Givens v. Berkley 2 ruled that the "pecuni-
ary condition of the defendant" could not be introduced to
affect the size of an exemplary damages award."5 The Court
reasoned that the jury's assessment of exemplary damages
should be based on the "enormity or wantonness of the [in-
jury causing] act and that the defendant's lack of financial re-
sources should not affect this assessment." ' The opinion was
perfectly consistent with the then current view of the Court
that exemplary damages were solely compensatory.8 5 When
the purpose of damages is only to restore the plaintiff to the
legal equivalent of his pre-injury condition, the financial re-
sources of the defendant are irrelevant.8 6 In Hensley v. Paul
Miller Ford, Inc.,87 the Court recently reaffirmed the rule an-
nounced in Givens v. Berkley,"' but it did so without recogniz-
ing that since 1908 Kentucky has also affirmed a punitive pur-
pose for exemplary damages.8 9
Although legitimate concerns have been expressed about
the potential prejudicial effect of such evidence on the jury's
was held to be not only "not erroneous" but also significant in determining that the
exemplary damages awarded were not "exorbitant").
82 56 S.W. 158 (Ky. 1900).
11 See id. at 159.
14 See id. The Court also suggested, unpersuasively, that allowing consideration
of the wealth of the defendant would require that the wealth of the plaintiff also be
introduced into evidence. See id.
85 See Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146 (1859). The focus of compensatory
damages was on the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The defendant's malice or wan-
tonness were considered as one measurement of that harm. See notes 24-31 supra
and accompanying text.
56 See In Defense, supra note 39, at 342 n.226. See also Dawson v. Shannon, 9
S.W.2d 998, 999 (Ky 1928) (in what appears to be an action for compensatory dam-
ages, the Court held it "immaterial ... that defendant was a man of means"). Only
when the focus shifts to the desire to punish does the defendant's wealth become
relevant. See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
11 508 S.W.2d at 759 (Ky. 1974).
" Id. at 764.
' Interestingly, in 1912, as the Court was in the midst of reaffirming the punitive
purposes of exemplary damages, it briefly allowed the jury to consider evidence of the
defendant's financial condition. See Shields' Adm'rs v. Rowland, 151 S.W. 408, 410
(Ky. 1912). One month later, on petition for rehearing, and apparently confronted
with its holding in Givens v. Berkley, the Court modified its earlier opinion to con-
form to Givens without recognizing the critical impact of its evolving understanding




determination of liability"0 and about the invasion of the de-
fendant's privacy resulting from the introduction of such evi-
dence,91 adequate procedural protection of the defendant is
possible. 2
The defendant's wealth should therefore be included
among the criteria for assessing exemplary damage awards to
effectively accomplish the punitive purpose of the award.
2. Criminal Sanctions Imposed on the Defendant
Few jurisdictions have formally considered whether liabil-
ity for criminal sanctions may be proved to mitigate exem-
plary damages.93 The jurisdictions which have considered this
as a criterion for exemplary damages assessment are closely
divided as to its relevance and admissibility.9 4 Although Ken-
tucky defendants have occasionally objected to exemplary
damages on the basis of their exposure to criminal sanctions, 5
Kentucky has not squarely addressed whether criminal sanc-
tions should be a factor in determining the amount of exem-
plary damages. Probably, because of the likelihood that such
information would prejudice the jury's determination of liabil-
ity, defendants have chosen not to offer evidence of their
criminal liability for the jury's consideration in assessing ex-
emplary damages.9 6
Although evidence of criminal sanctions would be irrele-
vant to the compensatory purposes of exemplary damages,97
the jury should be allowed to consider evidence of such sanc-
90 Some commentators have suggested the jury might succumb to the "'Robin
Hood' syndrome." See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 43, at 665. See also Morris,
supra note 8, at 1191.
91 See Note, Punitive Damages: An Exception to the Right of Privacy? Coy v.
Superior Court, 5 PEPPERDIN L. REv. 145 (1977-78).
92 See notes 101-06 infra and accompanying text.
'a See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 15, at § 5.34.
See id.
90 See Doerhoefer v. Shewmaker, 97 S.W. 7 (Ky. 1906); Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2
Met.) at 146.
90 Evidence of conviction, except by plea of guilty, may not be introduced against
the defendant in Kentucky. See, e.g., Race v. Chappell, 202 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Ky.
1947).
" The logic is analogous to the lack of relevance of evidence of wealth with re-
gard to compensatory damages. Cf. In Defense, supra note 39, at 342 n.226.
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tions ss in assessing the award necessary to gain the proper
amount of deterrence and to inflict the proper amount of ret-
ribution.99 The punitive effect of criminal and civil sanctions
is cumulative. Consequently, criminal sanctions may fulfill, at
least partially, the purposes of exemplary damages.1eo
III. PROCEDURAL IMPLEMENTATION
The criteria for assessment of punitive damages elabo-
rated above pose the potential for harm, rather than help, if
improvidently applied. Procedural safeguards are needed to
" In general, it is likely that the criminal sanctions will be real rather than
potential by the time of civil trial. However, when the civil trial occurs before crimi-
nal sanctions have been imposed and before the criminal statute of limitations has
run, the court is faced with a perplexing problem. Exemplary damages assessed in
consideration of potential criminal sanctions may leave the punitive purposes of the
award under-achieved if no criminal sanctions are forthcoming. Conversely, exem-
plary damages assessed without considering potential criminal sanctions may result in
excessive punishment if criminal sanctions are later imposed. This dilemma can be
resolved by requiring that a defendant submit only actually imposed criminal sanc-
tions in mitigation of exemplary damages and that whichever proceeding occurs sec-
ond, whether civil or criminal, consider the earlier judgment before imposing addi-
tional punitive sanctions. See Morris, supra note 8, at 1197.
99 It has also been suggested that a compensatory damages award has punitive
impact on the defendant and should be considered a mitigating factor in the award of
exemplary damages. See Morris, supra note 8, at 1175; Note, supra note 42, at 525;
In Defense, supra note 39, at 342 n.226; The Imposition, supra note 39, at 1171
n.109. This argument reasonably recognizes that the payment of a sizeable compensa-
tory award will deter the defendant from future culpable behavior. West Virginia has
adopted this line of reasoning and requires that the punitive effect of the compensa-
tory award be considered before any further punishment by way of exemplary dam-
ages is added. See, e.g., Ennis v. Brawley, 41 S.E.2d 680, 685 (W. Va. 1946).
Although a compensatory award would serve as a deterrent, it is unlikely that it
would fulfill the retributive purpose of an exemplary damages award. For example,
although a $1,000,000 compensatory damages award would have considerable deter-
rent effect, it seems unlikely that juries would feel that justice were achieved if the
same award were required for identical injuries whether caused through negligence or
malice. The retributive purpose of exemplary damages seems to require an award
over and beyond even the most deterrent of compensatory awards.
10O Allowing criminal sanctions to mitigate exemplary damages again focuses at-
tention on the constitutional issues alluded to in note 39 supra. Although there is an
apparent inconsistency in maintaining that exemplary damages do not expose the
defendant to double jeopardy while also suggesting that criminal and civil sanctions
are so fungible that the existence of one should be considered when imposing the
other, it does not follow that the defendant should be denied the opportunity to offer
evidence of criminal liability in an effort to mitigate civil liability. Hopefully, fairness
transcends apparent conceptual inconsistencies.
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insure that the use of such evidence is limited to proper pur-
poses. Otherwise, such evidence may prejudice the jury's find-
ings of liability.
A. Procedural Safeguards
Inviting the jury to consider both the defendant's wealth
and his criminal liability for the tortious conduct in question
threatens to prejudice the defendant's attempt to avoid liabil-
ity.'' Kentucky has, however, shown a surprising faith in the
ability of the jury to handle unnecessarily prejudicial informa-
tion about defendants in a criminal trial.102 Perhaps a stern
jury instruction against the prejudicial application of such in-
formation would suffice. 10 3
However, many commentators doubt the ability of the
jury to avoid being unduly influenced by this additional infor-
mation in its determination of the defendant's liability per
se. 0 4 The better view is for the Court to either order or
strongly encourage the bifurcation of civil actions involving
exemplary damages. 10 5 Bifurcation would allow the jury to
first find liability for exemplary damages 0 6 Then, the trial
would continue with the introduction of evidence on the de-
fendant's liability for criminal sanctions and on the defen-
dant's financial status. At the close of this second portion of
the trial, the jury would have the relevant information for a
101 See notes 90-91 & 96 supra and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., Carver v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Ky. 1982) (evidence
of prior conviction of a similar crime for which the defendant is being tried is admis-
sible for purposes of sentence enhancement, and bifurcation of the trial is not
required).
13 Carver is concerned with the'criminal law, and the Court seems to be defer-
ring to the legislature for guidelines in addressing what it views to be a statutory
concern. See 634 S.W.2d at 1422. Exemplary damages and the tortious conduct which
justifies their award are more properly within the domain of the common law and
judicial supervision. Thus, Carver may not be precedent in this area.
104 See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 43, at 665; Morris, supra note 8, at 1191;
Note, supra note 42, at 528.
100 In its discretion, the trial court may order the bifurcation of a trial pursuant
to Ky. R. Civ. P. 42.02: "If the court determines that separate trials will ... avoid
prejudice, or will be conducive to expedition and economy, it shall order a separate
trial of any. . . separate issue. . . " Id. (emphasis added). Appellate review can in-
sure that trial courts use this bifurcation option when needed.
106 The jury would also set routine compensatory damages at this stage.
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thorough and more reasoned assessment of exemplary dam-
ages against the defendant.
B. A Proper Instruction
The jury works best when properly guided.10 7 What may
appear to an appellate court to be a verdict based on "passion
and prejudice"108 may in fact be a verdict rationally arrived at
by a jury with an understanding of the purposes of exemplary
damages different from that held by the court.
A proper instruction should carefully consider the pur-
poses of exemplary damages and the assessment criteria which
logically follow from those purposes. Assuming liability is al-
ready established, an exemplary damages instruction might
read:
In your determination of the amount of exemplary damages,
you are to consider the following:
(1) Exemplary damages are awarded in part to punish the
defendant and to deter him and others from the conduct by
which he harmed the plaintiff.
(a) You must first determine what amount of monetary
judgment against the defendant, considering the defen-
dant's financial status, will provide the amount of pun-
ishment and deterrence needed. To do this you must
carefully consider both the plaintiff's injury and the
conduct which caused it.
(b) You must then, considering criminal sanc-
tions-both fines and incarceration-actually imposed
against the defendant for his conduct, reduce the mon-
etary award appropriately to insure that the total puni-
tive and deterrent effect is no more than you first de-
cided was needed.
(2) Exemplary damages are awarded in part to compensate
the plaintiff for the effect of the way in which the injury was
inflicted.
(a) You must determine whether the defendant's con-
101 See Morris, supra note 8, at 1207-08.
108 See, e.g., Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d at 763-64 (remanding
for a new trial on the amount of exemplary damages).
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duct has caused intangible injuries for which the plain-
tiff should be, but has not been, compensated, and you
are to determine a monetary figure, if any, which would
compensate the plaintiff for these injuries." 9
(3) You are to combine the amounts you reached in (1)(b)
and (2)(a) as your total assessment of exemplary damages
against the defendant.
While a bit dry and complicated, such an instruction would
give the jury a conceptual framework to use in arriving at an
exemplary damages award.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky has a rich and interesting history of attempting
to make sense out of its doctrine of exemplary damages. No
doubt, that history is far from complete.110 But the needs of
the jury for clear criteria upon which to base an assessment of
exemplary damages suggest that the Court should review its
current understanding of the purposes of exemplary damages
and then begin the process of turning those purposes into as-
sessment criteria which can be incorporated into jury
instructions.
Theodore Emens Cowen
109 For purposes of this instruction, "loss of equilibrium" is understood to be one
of the intangible injuries which the jury might discern. Actually instructing a jury to
look for vengeful feelings might lead plaintiffs to nourish such feelings-a socially
undesirable result.
110 See note 39 supra for a hint of the apparently growing debate over the valid-
ity per se of exemplary damages.
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